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ABSTRACT:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsimulated	 ﾠbut	 ﾠnot	 ﾠimplemented	 ﾠ
computationally,	 ﾠjust	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcomet	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsimulated	 ﾠbut	 ﾠnot	 ﾠimplemented	 ﾠ
computationally.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠthing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠallows	 ﾠus	 ﾠeven	 ﾠto	 ﾠimagine	 ﾠotherwise	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcognition,	 ﾠ
unlike	 ﾠa	 ﾠcomet,	 ﾠis	 ﾠinvisible	 ﾠ(to	 ﾠall	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcognizer).	 ﾠ
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David	 ﾠChalmers’s	 ﾠ(2012)	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠon	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠand	 ﾠcomputation	 ﾠis	 ﾠeither	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
trivial	 ﾠor	 ﾠnontrivial	 ﾠbut	 ﾠfalse.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
What	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠbut	 ﾠtrivial	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ(just	 ﾠabout)	 ﾠany	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠit’s	 ﾠa	 ﾠgalaxy,	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠgall-ﾭ‐bladder	 ﾠor	 ﾠa	 ﾠgrain	 ﾠof	 ﾠsand	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmodeled	 ﾠcomputationally,	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠ(if	 ﾠ
successful)	 ﾠfully	 ﾠcapturing	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠhence	 ﾠexplaining)	 ﾠits	 ﾠ(relevant)	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠmechanism:	 ﾠ
how	 ﾠit	 ﾠworks.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
That	 ﾠis	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpsychology,	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠscience,	 ﾠneuroscience	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
artificial	 ﾠintelligence	 ﾠwould	 ﾠwant	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠthings	 ﾠthey	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠand	 ﾠhope	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
explain	 ﾠcausally:	 ﾠorganisms,	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠbrains,	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠbehavior,	 ﾠand	 ﾠartificial	 ﾠdevices	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
build	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠcapable	 ﾠof	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠbehavior.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthat’s	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠthat	 ﾠphysics,	 ﾠ
chemistry,	 ﾠbiology	 ﾠand	 ﾠengineering	 ﾠalready	 ﾠhave	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠthings	 ﾠthey	 ﾠstudy,	 ﾠ
without	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ“A	 ﾠComputational	 ﾠFoundation	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠStudy	 ﾠof	 ﾠ	 ﾠPlanetary	 ﾠ
Motion”	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠof	 ﾠHelium,	 ﾠor	 ﾠof	 ﾠHemoglobin,	 ﾠor	 ﾠof	 ﾠConvection	 ﾠHeaters).	 ﾠIt’s	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
ubiquitous	 ﾠobservation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ–	 ﾠalongside	 ﾠlanguage	 ﾠand	 ﾠmathematics	 ﾠ–	 ﾠcomputers	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
computational	 ﾠalgorithms	 ﾠare	 ﾠuseful	 ﾠtools	 ﾠin	 ﾠexplaining	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthings	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
world	 ﾠand	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwork	 ﾠ(Searle’s	 ﾠ1980	 ﾠ“Weak	 ﾠAI”).	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠanother	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠconstruing	 ﾠDavid’s	 ﾠthesis,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ–	 ﾠunlike,	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠ
flying,	 ﾠor	 ﾠdigesting,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcan	 ﾠlikewise	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmodeled	 ﾠand	 ﾠexplained	 ﾠcomputationally	 ﾠ
(but	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot,	 ﾠas	 ﾠDavid	 ﾠagrees,	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠinstances	 ﾠof	 ﾠcomputation)	 ﾠ–	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
(just)	 ﾠcomputation	 ﾠ(Harnad	 ﾠ1994).	 ﾠ
It’s	 ﾠnot	 ﾠreally	 ﾠclear	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠtheses	 ﾠDavid	 ﾠintends.	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠtry	 ﾠto	 ﾠflesh	 ﾠout	 ﾠ
both	 ﾠtheses	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠgetting	 ﾠbogged	 ﾠdown	 ﾠin	 ﾠtechnical	 ﾠdetails	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠinteresting	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠpertinent	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠdistinction.	 ﾠ
Computation	 ﾠis	 ﾠsymbol	 ﾠmanipulation:	 ﾠsymbols	 ﾠare	 ﾠobjects	 ﾠof	 ﾠarbitrary	 ﾠshape	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠare	 ﾠmanipulated	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠrules	 ﾠ(“algorthms”)	 ﾠthat	 ﾠoperate	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshapes	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsymbols,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠmeanings.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠother	 ﾠwords,	 ﾠcomputation	 ﾠis	 ﾠsyntactic,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
semantic.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠmost	 ﾠcomputations	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinterpreted	 ﾠas	 ﾠmeaning	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠ
(otherwise	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbother	 ﾠdesigning	 ﾠand	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠthem):	 ﾠWe	 ﾠare	 ﾠinterested	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
algorithms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠcompute	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠuseful,	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠit’s	 ﾠplanetary	 ﾠmotion	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
payroll	 ﾠchecks.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
How	 ﾠdo	 ﾠcomputations	 ﾠdo	 ﾠuseful	 ﾠthings?	 ﾠThere	 ﾠare	 ﾠmany	 ﾠways.	 ﾠNumerical	 ﾠalgorithms	 ﾠ
compute	 ﾠquantitative	 ﾠresults	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠinterested	 ﾠin.	 ﾠDesk	 ﾠcalculators	 ﾠimplement	 ﾠ
numerical	 ﾠalgorithms.	 ﾠBoolean	 ﾠ(and/or/not)	 ﾠsearch	 ﾠin	 ﾠGoogle’s	 ﾠdatabase	 ﾠretrieves	 ﾠ
documents	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠinterested	 ﾠin.	 ﾠNASA’s	 ﾠsimulations	 ﾠanticipate	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmight	 ﾠ
arise	 ﾠin	 ﾠspace	 ﾠflights.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠCopernicus	 ﾠand	 ﾠGalileo	 ﾠhad	 ﾠhad	 ﾠdigital	 ﾠcomputers,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠ(just	 ﾠmight!)	 ﾠhave	 ﾠreached	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠconclusions	 ﾠfaster,	 ﾠor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠconvincingly.	 ﾠ
Appel	 ﾠ&	 ﾠHaken	 ﾠproved	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfour-ﾭ‐color	 ﾠtheorem	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠof	 ﾠcomputation	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1976.	 ﾠ
And	 ﾠif	 ﾠMozart	 ﾠhad	 ﾠhad	 ﾠa	 ﾠcomputer	 ﾠto	 ﾠconvert	 ﾠkeyboard	 ﾠimprovisation	 ﾠinto	 ﾠmetered	 ﾠ
notation,	 ﾠready	 ﾠto	 ﾠprint	 ﾠor	 ﾠedit	 ﾠand	 ﾠrevise	 ﾠonline,	 ﾠhumankind	 ﾠmight	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠleft	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
much	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠlegacy	 ﾠof	 ﾠimmortal	 ﾠmasterpieces	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠhis	 ﾠtragically	 ﾠshort	 ﾠ35	 ﾠyears	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
life.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠword	 ﾠabout	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠ–	 ﾠa	 ﾠtricky	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠgoes	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠheart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmatter.	 ﾠ
Consider	 ﾠgravitation.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠcurrently	 ﾠunderstood,	 ﾠgravitation	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠ
force	 ﾠof	 ﾠattraction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠbodies,	 ﾠproportional	 ﾠto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrespective	 ﾠmasses.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠever	 ﾠ
there	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠprototypical	 ﾠinstance	 ﾠof	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠstructure,	 ﾠcausing,	 ﾠgravitational	 ﾠ
attraction	 ﾠis	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠan	 ﾠinstance.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Now	 ﾠgravitational	 ﾠattraction	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmodeled	 ﾠexactly,	 ﾠby	 ﾠdifferential	 ﾠequations,	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
computationally,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠdiscrete	 ﾠapproximations.	 ﾠOur	 ﾠsolar	 ﾠsystem’s	 ﾠplanetary	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠsun,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠgravitational	 ﾠinteractions,	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
“mirrored”	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠcomputer	 ﾠsimulation	 ﾠto	 ﾠas	 ﾠclose	 ﾠan	 ﾠapproximation	 ﾠas	 ﾠwe	 ﾠlike.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠno	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠwould	 ﾠimagine	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomputer	 ﾠsimulation	 ﾠactually	 ﾠembodied	 ﾠplanetary	 ﾠ
motion:	 ﾠIt	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠevident	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnothing	 ﾠactually	 ﾠmoving,	 ﾠnor	 ﾠanything	 ﾠ
actually	 ﾠexerting	 ﾠgravitational	 ﾠattraction	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomputational	 ﾠmodel.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcomputer	 ﾠ
implementation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠalgorithm	 ﾠwould	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠhave	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠ–	 ﾠa	 ﾠcomputer,	 ﾠ
computing,	 ﾠis,	 ﾠafter	 ﾠall,	 ﾠa	 ﾠphysical,	 ﾠdynamical	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠtoo,	 ﾠhence,	 ﾠlike	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsolar	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠ
itself,	 ﾠgoverned	 ﾠby	 ﾠdifferential	 ﾠequations.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
implementation,	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠdynamical	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠright,	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwrong	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠ
structure	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠwould	 ﾠobey	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwrong	 ﾠdifferential	 ﾠequations),	 ﾠinsofar	 ﾠas	 ﾠplanetary	 ﾠmotion	 ﾠwas	 ﾠconcerned.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠplanets,	 ﾠmoving:	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠcomputer	 ﾠhardware,	 ﾠexecuting	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠalgorithm,	 ﾠ
thereby	 ﾠformally	 ﾠ“mirroring”	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠplanetary	 ﾠmotion,	 ﾠas	 ﾠencoded	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠalgorithm.	 ﾠTwo	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠdynamical	 ﾠsystems,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠdynamical	 ﾠ
properties:	 ﾠthose	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhardware,	 ﾠimplementing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠalgorithm,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthose	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
planets,	 ﾠorbiting.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
So	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠsense	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomputational	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠ“mirror”	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
causal	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠmodeling?	 ﾠThe	 ﾠreply	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠmirrors	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
formally.	 ﾠThat	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsymbols	 ﾠand	 ﾠsymbol	 ﾠmanipulations	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠsystematically	 ﾠinterpreted	 ﾠas	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠcounterparts	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthing	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠmodeled.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠ
don’t	 ﾠeven	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠresort	 ﾠto	 ﾠcomputational	 ﾠsimulations	 ﾠof	 ﾠplanetary	 ﾠmotion,	 ﾠnor	 ﾠ
even	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexact	 ﾠdifferential	 ﾠequations	 ﾠof	 ﾠphysics	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠthis:	 ﾠWe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠsee	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠgeometry,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠx2	 ﾠ+	 ﾠy2	 ﾠ=	 ﾠr2	 ﾠ“mirrors”	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshape	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcircle:	 ﾠYes,	 ﾠx2	 ﾠ+	 ﾠy2	 ﾠ=	 ﾠr2	 ﾠ
“captures”	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinvariant	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcircle,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠcircle,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠshaped	 ﾠ
like	 ﾠa	 ﾠcircle.	 ﾠ(Reminder:	 ﾠa	 ﾠcircle	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠthing	 ﾠyou	 ﾠsee	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠflag.)	 ﾠNo	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠwould	 ﾠthink	 ﾠotherwise,	 ﾠdespite	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaccurate	 ﾠmirroring.	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠall	 ﾠobvious.	 ﾠEveryone	 ﾠknows	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmathematical	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠverbal)	 ﾠ
description	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠthing	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠthing	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthing	 ﾠitself,	 ﾠdespite	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
shared	 ﾠformal	 ﾠinvariance.	 ﾠWhy	 ﾠwould	 ﾠone	 ﾠeven	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtempted	 ﾠto	 ﾠthink	 ﾠotherwise?	 ﾠWe	 ﾠ
immediately	 ﾠsee	 ﾠby	 ﾠobservation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠcomputational	 ﾠsolar	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠlacks	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
essential	 ﾠfeature	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠreal	 ﾠsolar	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠdespite	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshared	 ﾠ“causal	 ﾠstructure,”	 ﾠnamely,	 ﾠ
there	 ﾠare	 ﾠno	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠthere,	 ﾠmoving,	 ﾠany	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠanything	 ﾠround	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
formal	 ﾠequation	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠcircle.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠstatic	 ﾠor	 ﾠdynamic	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠis	 ﾠjust	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
explanatory	 ﾠdevice,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠreincarnation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthing	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠmodelling.	 ﾠ
So	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠevident	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠphysics,	 ﾠchemistry,	 ﾠbiology	 ﾠ(synthetic	 ﾠhearts	 ﾠpump	 ﾠ
blood,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠcomputational	 ﾠhearts	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot)	 ﾠand	 ﾠeven	 ﾠmathematics	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“causal	 ﾠ
structure”	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠ(whether	 ﾠcomputational	 ﾠor	 ﾠanalytic,	 ﾠsymbolic	 ﾠor	 ﾠnumeric,	 ﾠ
discrete	 ﾠor	 ﾠcontinuous,	 ﾠapproximate	 ﾠor	 ﾠexact)	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠone	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠfull	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠ
explanation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthing	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠmodeled,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠnot	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠinstantiation	 ﾠof	 ﾠit,	 ﾠunless	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠembodies	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠproperties	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthing	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠmodeled	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠway	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
synthetic	 ﾠheart	 ﾠdoes)	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠjust	 ﾠformally	 ﾠ“mirroring”	 ﾠthem	 ﾠby	 ﾠphysically	 ﾠ
implementing	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcomputation	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠway	 ﾠa	 ﾠcomputational	 ﾠheart	 ﾠwould	 ﾠdo).	 ﾠWhy	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠnot	 ﾠso	 ﾠevident	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognition?	 ﾠ
How	 ﾠcould	 ﾠDavid	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠso	 ﾠmany	 ﾠothers)	 ﾠhave	 ﾠfallen	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠerror	 ﾠof	 ﾠconfusing	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
two	 ﾠsenses	 ﾠof	 ﾠcausality,	 ﾠone	 ﾠformal,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠphysical?	 ﾠAgain,	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
obvious.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠerror	 ﾠis	 ﾠalways	 ﾠmade	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognition.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠon	 ﾠearth	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠcognition?	 ﾠUnlike,	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠmovement,	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠis	 ﾠinvisible!	 ﾠ(1)	 ﾠWe	 ﾠall	 ﾠknow	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠ
cognizing	 ﾠorganisms	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdo.	 ﾠ(2)	 ﾠWe	 ﾠall	 ﾠknow	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠbrain	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠis.	 ﾠ(3)	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠwe	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
know	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠfeels	 ﾠlike	 ﾠto	 ﾠcognize.	 ﾠ(1)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(2)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(behavior	 ﾠand	 ﾠbrain	 ﾠactivity)	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
perfectly	 ﾠvisible;	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠno	 ﾠidea	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbrain	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
generates	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbehavioral	 ﾠcapacity,	 ﾠlet	 ﾠalone	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcognition.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠthe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠone	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
whom	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠitself	 ﾠis	 ﾠ“visible”	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcognizer	 ﾠ(3).	 ﾠSo	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠspeculate	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠgenerates	 ﾠcognition,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠspeculating	 ﾠabout	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠinvisible	 ﾠto	 ﾠeveryone	 ﾠexcept	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcognizer,	 ﾠnamely,	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠitself;	 ﾠand	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠspeculating	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠbrain	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠsynthetic	 ﾠdevice	 ﾠactivity,	 ﾠif	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠis	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠin	 ﾠsynthetic	 ﾠ
devices)	 ﾠgenerates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠinvisible	 ﾠcognition.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Let’s	 ﾠcontrast	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbrain	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠinvisible	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
planetary	 ﾠmotion,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠbodily	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠother	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbrain,	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠof	 ﾠinvisibility	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠarise:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠheart.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠreason	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
never	 ﾠdream	 ﾠof	 ﾠsaying	 ﾠthat	 ﾠplanetary	 ﾠmotion	 ﾠwas	 ﾠjust	 ﾠcomputational,	 ﾠor	 ﾠof	 ﾠsaying	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠplanets	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠcomputational	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠwere	 ﾠactually	 ﾠmoving	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠ
mirrors	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ“causal	 ﾠstructure”	 ﾠis	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠthat	 ﾠplanetary	 ﾠmotion	 ﾠis	 ﾠvisible	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠ
observable	 ﾠby	 ﾠinstruments).	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠit’s	 ﾠjust	 ﾠobvious	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomputational	 ﾠmodel,	 ﾠ
even	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠshares	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformal	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠinvariants	 ﾠof	 ﾠplanetary	 ﾠmotion,	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmove.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
same	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomputational	 ﾠheart:	 ﾠUnlike	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsynthetic	 ﾠheart,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠreally	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
pump	 ﾠblood	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠsome	 ﾠother	 ﾠliquid),	 ﾠa	 ﾠ(purely)	 ﾠcomputational	 ﾠheart	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠpump	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
thing.	 ﾠ(And	 ﾠnote	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠtalking	 ﾠabout	 ﾠa	 ﾠphysically	 ﾠimplemented	 ﾠcomputational	 ﾠ
heart	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmirrors	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠreal	 ﾠheart.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠsymbolically	 ﾠ
pumping	 ﾠsymbolic	 ﾠblood.)	 ﾠ
Now	 ﾠimagine	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠthing	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbrain.	 ﾠIt’s	 ﾠa	 ﾠbit	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcomplicated,	 ﾠbecause,	 ﾠ
unlike	 ﾠthe	 ﾠheart,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbrain	 ﾠis	 ﾠactually	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠnot	 ﾠone,	 ﾠnor	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthree	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠ
things.	 ﾠOne	 ﾠthing	 ﾠis	 ﾠgenerating	 ﾠ(1)	 ﾠbehavioral	 ﾠcapacity:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠbrain	 ﾠis	 ﾠgenerating	 ﾠjust	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠeverything	 ﾠour	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠdo,	 ﾠand	 ﾠare	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠworld.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
second	 ﾠthing	 ﾠis	 ﾠ(2)	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbrain	 ﾠitself	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠaction	 ﾠpotentials	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
secretions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠgoing	 ﾠon	 ﾠinside	 ﾠit).	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠfinally,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbrain	 ﾠis	 ﾠ(3)	 ﾠcognizing	 ﾠ
(whatever	 ﾠthat	 ﾠturns	 ﾠout	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwill	 ﾠreturn	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis).	 ﾠ
So,	 ﾠunlike	 ﾠthe	 ﾠplanets	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠheart,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠare	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠjust	 ﾠone	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠthing,	 ﾠall	 ﾠof	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
fully	 ﾠobservable	 ﾠto	 ﾠus	 ﾠ(moving	 ﾠand	 ﾠpumping,	 ﾠrespectively),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbrain	 ﾠis	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠthree	 ﾠ
kinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠthings,	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠof	 ﾠthem	 ﾠvisible	 ﾠ(behavior	 ﾠand	 ﾠbrain	 ﾠactivity),	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthem	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
(cognition).	 ﾠ
Now	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠpinpoint	 ﾠexactly	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠerror	 ﾠkeeps	 ﾠcreeping	 ﾠin:	 ﾠNo	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠwould	 ﾠcall	 ﾠa	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠa	 ﾠsuccess	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠcould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdemonstrated	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
generate	 ﾠour	 ﾠbehavioral	 ﾠcapacity.	 ﾠSo	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠbecomes:	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
generate	 ﾠour	 ﾠbehavioral	 ﾠcapacity?	 ﾠThat’s	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTuring	 ﾠTest	 ﾠ(TT)	 ﾠcomes	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
(Harnad	 ﾠ2008):	 ﾠA	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠcan	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠour	 ﾠbehavioral	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠpass	 ﾠTT	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
full	 ﾠrobotic	 ﾠversion	 ﾠof	 ﾠTT,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjust	 ﾠthe	 ﾠverbal	 ﾠversion	 ﾠ(i.e.,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠability	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠeverything	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdo	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjust	 ﾠto	 ﾠtalk	 ﾠabout	 ﾠit):	 ﾠA	 ﾠsensory-ﾭ‐motor	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
could	 ﾠpass	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrobotic	 ﾠTT	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠperform	 ﾠindistinguishably	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
any	 ﾠof	 ﾠus,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠlifetime	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ
Let’s	 ﾠset	 ﾠaside	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠthing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbrains	 ﾠdo	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠbrain	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ
because	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠcontroversial	 ﾠhow	 ﾠmany	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠwhich)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠof	 ﾠbrain	 ﾠ
activity	 ﾠare	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠeither	 ﾠto	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠour	 ﾠbehavioral	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠor	 ﾠto	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠ
cognition.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠcould	 ﾠconceivably	 ﾠturn	 ﾠout	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠway	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuccessfully	 ﾠ
generate	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠis	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpreserves	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠ	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdynamic	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠof	 ﾠbrain	 ﾠ
activity	 ﾠ(electrochemical	 ﾠactivity,	 ﾠsecretions,	 ﾠchemistry	 ﾠetc.).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcase	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthose	 ﾠobservable	 ﾠ(neural)	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠwere	 ﾠmissing	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomputational	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠas	 ﾠvisible	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmotion	 ﾠwas	 ﾠmissing	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
computational	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠof	 ﾠplanetary	 ﾠmotion.	 ﾠLet’s	 ﾠcall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhypothesis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠ
“neuralism.”	 ﾠ
It’s	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmy	 ﾠcritique	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
computation	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠrest	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠthat	 ﾠneuralism	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠwill	 ﾠdiscuss	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠissue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimplementation-ﾭ‐independence	 ﾠof	 ﾠcomputation	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠmoment,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
don’t	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠgenerating	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠdepends	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠrequirement	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
neurosimilitude	 ﾠ(necessarily	 ﾠpreserving	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdynamic	 ﾠproperties	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
brain).	 ﾠNeurosimilitude	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠneeded	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbrain	 ﾠworks,	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠnot	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠeither	 ﾠhow	 ﾠto	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbrain’s	 ﾠbehavioral	 ﾠ
capacity	 ﾠor	 ﾠto	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠhow	 ﾠto	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠcognition.	 ﾠ
Consider	 ﾠbehavioral	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfirst:	 ﾠLet	 ﾠus	 ﾠagree	 ﾠat	 ﾠonce	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhatever	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
build	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsucceeds	 ﾠin	 ﾠgenerating	 ﾠour	 ﾠactual	 ﾠbehavioral	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠ–	 ﾠi.e.,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
pass	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfull	 ﾠrobotic	 ﾠversion	 ﾠof	 ﾠTT,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠlifetime	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwould	 ﾠdefinitely	 ﾠhave	 ﾠexplained	 ﾠ
our	 ﾠbehavioral	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠ(1),	 ﾠfully	 ﾠand	 ﾠcausally,	 ﾠregardless	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠit	 ﾠdid	 ﾠit	 ﾠvia	 ﾠ
secretions	 ﾠor	 ﾠcomputations.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠit	 ﾠwere	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠit	 ﾠcomputationally,	 ﾠby	 ﾠimplementing	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
algorithm,	 ﾠit’s	 ﾠclear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠalso	 ﾠneed	 ﾠa	 ﾠrobotic	 ﾠbody,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsensors	 ﾠand	 ﾠmoving	 ﾠ
parts,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthose	 ﾠcould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠjust	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimplementations	 ﾠof	 ﾠalgorithms.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Sensing,	 ﾠlike	 ﾠmovement	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠflying,	 ﾠand	 ﾠdigestion),	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠimplementation-ﾭ‐
independent	 ﾠsymbol-ﾭ‐manipulation.	 ﾠConsider	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthere	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠsuccessful	 ﾠTT-ﾭ‐passing	 ﾠrobot	 ﾠthat	 ﾠconsisted	 ﾠof	 ﾠnothing	 ﾠother	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ(i)	 ﾠsensors	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
movable	 ﾠperipheral	 ﾠparts	 ﾠplus	 ﾠ(ii)	 ﾠa	 ﾠfunctional	 ﾠ“core”	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwork	 ﾠ
(other	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠI/O	 ﾠitself)	 ﾠwas	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠdone	 ﾠby	 ﾠan	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠcomputational	 ﾠmodule	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠmirrored	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbrain	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠof	 ﾠany	 ﾠother	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠcapable	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
passing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTT).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠreally	 ﾠboils	 ﾠdown	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠlink-ﾭ‐up	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠour	 ﾠsensory	 ﾠand	 ﾠmotor	 ﾠsystems,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrest	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
nervous	 ﾠsystem,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother,	 ﾠcan	 ﾠreally	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsplit	 ﾠinto	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠautonomous	 ﾠmodules	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
peripheral	 ﾠsensorimotor	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠnoncomputational,	 ﾠplus	 ﾠa	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwas	 ﾠcomputational.	 ﾠ
I	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠsplit	 ﾠis	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠor	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠ
sense.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠme	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems	 ﾠjust	 ﾠas	 ﾠunlikely	 ﾠas	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcould	 ﾠdivide	 ﾠheart	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
noncomputational	 ﾠI/O	 ﾠmodule	 ﾠfeeding	 ﾠinto	 ﾠand	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcomputational	 ﾠcore.	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink	 ﾠ
sensorimotor	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbrain	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠand	 ﾠthrough,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
intuition	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠbrain-ﾭ‐in-ﾭ‐a-ﾭ‐vat	 ﾠreceiving	 ﾠits	 ﾠI/O	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintuition	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomputational-ﾭ‐core-ﾭ‐in-ﾭ‐a-ﾭ‐vat	 ﾠintuition	 ﾠderives	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠis	 ﾠboth	 ﾠunrealistic	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
homuncular.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠlet	 ﾠus	 ﾠagree	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠfunctional	 ﾠpartition	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
empirical	 ﾠquestion,	 ﾠinsofar	 ﾠas	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠto	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠour	 ﾠbehavioral	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
concerned.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠTT	 ﾠcould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpassed	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠcomputational	 ﾠcore	 ﾠplus	 ﾠI/O	 ﾠperipherals	 ﾠ
then	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠcomputationalism	 ﾠfails.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠif	 ﾠTT	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsuccessfully	 ﾠpassed	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠcomputational	 ﾠcore	 ﾠplus	 ﾠI/O	 ﾠperipherals,	 ﾠwould	 ﾠthat	 ﾠentail	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠ
computationalism	 ﾠwas	 ﾠcorrect	 ﾠafter	 ﾠall?	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠto	 ﾠremind	 ﾠourselves	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe’ve	 ﾠleft	 ﾠout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthird	 ﾠburden	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠ
theory,	 ﾠin	 ﾠaddition	 ﾠto	 ﾠbehavioral	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠ(1)	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠbrain	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠ(2),	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe’ve	 ﾠ
agreed	 ﾠto	 ﾠignore):	 ﾠEven	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdefine	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠas	 ﾠwhatever	 ﾠit	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠto	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠTT	 ﾠ
capacity,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTT	 ﾠleaves	 ﾠout,	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠinvisible	 ﾠto	 ﾠeveryone	 ﾠ
except	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcognizer,	 ﾠnamely,	 ﾠconsciousness:	 ﾠit	 ﾠfeels	 ﾠlike	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠto	 ﾠcognize	 ﾠ(3).	 ﾠBut	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠproperty,	 ﾠunlike	 ﾠmovement	 ﾠor	 ﾠsecretions,	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠperceived	 ﾠby	 ﾠanyone	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
than	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcognizer	 ﾠhimself.	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠthis	 ﾠinvisibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreal	 ﾠ
reason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠerror	 ﾠof	 ﾠconfusing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomputational	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠ
structure	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠitself:	 ﾠIt	 ﾠlooks	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
outside	 ﾠas	 ﾠif	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠgoing	 ﾠon	 ﾠinside	 ﾠa	 ﾠcomputational	 ﾠ
model	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠgoing	 ﾠon	 ﾠinside	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbrain	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcognizer.	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠreason	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcomputation	 ﾠalone	 ﾠlooks	 ﾠlike	 ﾠa	 ﾠviable	 ﾠcandidate	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstantiating,	 ﾠ
rather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠexplaining	 ﾠcognition.	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthat	 ﾠDavid	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠaware	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdistinction.	 ﾠHe	 ﾠwrites:	 ﾠ“Psychological	 ﾠ
properties	 ﾠare	 ﾠconcerned	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠthing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmind	 ﾠdoes,	 ﾠand	 ﾠphenomenal	 ﾠ
properties	 ﾠare	 ﾠconcerned	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠit	 ﾠfeels.”	 ﾠBut	 ﾠhe	 ﾠthinks	 ﾠhis	 ﾠ“dancing	 ﾠqualia”	 ﾠ
argument	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfeeling	 ﾠmust,	 ﾠlike	 ﾠcomputation	 ﾠitself,	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠimplementation-ﾭ‐
independent	 ﾠproperty,	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠin	 ﾠevery	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠalgorithm	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
successfully	 ﾠcaptures	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠstructure,	 ﾠno	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠhow	 ﾠradically	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
implementations	 ﾠdiffer.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhypothesize	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠphysically	 ﾠ
different	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ	 ﾠcausally	 ﾠinvariant	 ﾠimplementations	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠstructure,	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
feeling	 ﾠone	 ﾠway	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠfeeling	 ﾠanother	 ﾠway	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠnot	 ﾠfeeling	 ﾠat	 ﾠall),	 ﾠboth	 ﾠ
variants	 ﾠimplemented	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠhardware	 ﾠso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠone	 ﾠcould	 ﾠthrow	 ﾠa	 ﾠswitch	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
flip	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠone	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠvariant	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠ
was	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠfor	 ﾠboth	 ﾠvariants	 ﾠwould	 ﾠprevent	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhypothetical	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠin	 ﾠfeeling	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠfelt.	 ﾠSo	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠinvariance	 ﾠwould	 ﾠguarantee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfeeling	 ﾠinvariance.	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtrouble	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthis	 ﾠargument	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠfor	 ﾠgranted	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfeeling,	 ﾠ
unlike	 ﾠmovement,	 ﾠis	 ﾠinvisible.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠreason	 ﾠthe	 ﾠflip/flop	 ﾠthought	 ﾠexperiment	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
guarantee	 ﾠthat	 ﾠall	 ﾠimplementations	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsolar	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
heart	 ﾠmove	 ﾠand	 ﾠbeat,	 ﾠrespectively,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmoving	 ﾠand	 ﾠbeating	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcomputational	 ﾠ
properties,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠsee	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ(it	 ﾠis	 ﾠempirically	 ﾠ“observable”).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠfeeling,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠreason	 ﾠthis	 ﾠvery	 ﾠsame	 ﾠdistinct	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠequally	 ﾠevident	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠfeeling	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfeeling	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠnot-ﾭ‐feeling	 ﾠit,	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe)	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcognizer.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠ
unless	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠprepared	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeclare	 ﾠfeeling	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠidentical	 ﾠwith	 ﾠobservable	 ﾠbehavioral	 ﾠ
capacity	 ﾠ	 ﾠby	 ﾠdefinition	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠrather	 ﾠad	 ﾠhoc	 ﾠand	 ﾠretro	 ﾠmove,	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠwould	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtantamount	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeclaring	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠcomputationalism	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
definition	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠallow	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfeeling,	 ﾠlike	 ﾠmoving	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
flying,	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠan	 ﾠimplementation-ﾭ‐independent	 ﾠcomputational	 ﾠproperty	 ﾠbut	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
dynamical,	 ﾠimplementation-ﾭdependent	 ﾠone.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthen	 ﾠflipping	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠone	 ﾠcausally	 ﾠ
invariant	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠto	 ﾠanother	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠlike	 ﾠflipping	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠcausally	 ﾠ
invariant	 ﾠimplementations	 ﾠof	 ﾠplanetary	 ﾠmotions,	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmoves	 ﾠand	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠ
not.	 ﾠ“Demoting”	 ﾠfeeling	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠdynamical	 ﾠproperty,	 ﾠits	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠor	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠmarked	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
conformity	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠdifferential	 ﾠequations	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠcomputer	 ﾠ
program,	 ﾠreleases	 ﾠfeeling	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠimplementation-ﾭ‐independent	 ﾠ
computational	 ﾠproperty.	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfelt	 ﾠcognition?	 ﾠHere	 ﾠDavid	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
unlike	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠsensorimotor	 ﾠperipherals	 ﾠand	 ﾠcomputational	 ﾠcore	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
marks	 ﾠa	 ﾠsolid	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠdifference:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠof	 ﾠexplaining	 ﾠbehavioral	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠ
(doing)	 ﾠis	 ﾠ“easy”	 ﾠto	 ﾠsolve.	 ﾠCognitive	 ﾠscience	 ﾠis	 ﾠnowhere	 ﾠnear	 ﾠsolving	 ﾠit,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthere	 ﾠ
seem	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠno	 ﾠprincipled	 ﾠobstacles.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠof	 ﾠexplaining	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠand	 ﾠhow	 ﾠwe	 ﾠfeel	 ﾠ
(the	 ﾠ“mind/body	 ﾠproblem”),	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠhard	 ﾠto	 ﾠsolve,	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠeven	 ﾠimpossible	 ﾠ
(Harnad	 ﾠ2000).	 ﾠ
So	 ﾠthere’s	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsaid	 ﾠfor	 ﾠconcentrating	 ﾠon	 ﾠsolving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“easy”	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
explaining	 ﾠhow	 ﾠto	 ﾠpass	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTT	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠ(Harnad	 ﾠ&	 ﾠScherzer	 ﾠ2008).	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠunlikely	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsolution	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠpurely	 ﾠcomputational	 ﾠone.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠ
mechanism	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsucceeds	 ﾠin	 ﾠpassing	 ﾠTT	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠhybrid	 ﾠdynamic/computational	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdynamics	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthose	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhardware	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
computation	 ﾠ(those	 ﾠreally	 ﾠare	 ﾠirrelevant	 ﾠto	 ﾠcognition).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdynamics	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthose	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠsensori-ﾭ‐motor	 ﾠsurface	 ﾠ–	 ﾠplus	 ﾠall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠtopographic	 ﾠ(spatial	 ﾠshape-ﾭ‐
preserving)	 ﾠdynamics	 ﾠin	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ(Silver	 ﾠ&	 ﾠKastner	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠThat	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
computation	 ﾠalone	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“causal	 ﾠtopography”	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognition.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠonce	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ(“easy”)	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠis	 ﾠsolved,	 ﾠonly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTT-ﾭ‐passing	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠitself	 ﾠwill	 ﾠknow	 ﾠ
whether	 ﾠit	 ﾠreally	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠcognize	 ﾠ–	 ﾠi.e.,	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠit	 ﾠreally	 ﾠfeels	 ﾠlike	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
TT-ﾭ‐passer.	 ﾠ(Being	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠobservation	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
require	 ﾠsolving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ(insoluble)	 ﾠother-ﾭ‐minds	 ﾠproblem.)	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhad	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
guarantee	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgods	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTT-ﾭ‐passer	 ﾠreally	 ﾠcognizes,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠstill	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
explain	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTT-ﾭ‐passer	 ﾠfeels.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠfeeling	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠtopography	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠwill	 ﾠcontinue	 ﾠto	 ﾠdefy	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠ
feeling	 ﾠis	 ﾠreally	 ﾠgoing	 ﾠon	 ﾠin	 ﾠthere	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠprobably	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠmore	 ﾠexplanatory	 ﾠ
“room”	 ﾠleft,	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠexplanation,	 ﾠonce	 ﾠall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠdynamics	 ﾠare	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠinto	 ﾠ
account	 ﾠ(Harnad	 ﾠ2011).	 ﾠ
So	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠis	 ﾠit	 ﾠunlikely	 ﾠthat	 ﾠimplementing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠcomputations	 ﾠwill	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠ
cognition,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwhatever	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠ
computationally,	 ﾠdynamically,	 ﾠor	 ﾠvia	 ﾠa	 ﾠhybrid	 ﾠcombination	 ﾠof	 ﾠboth	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠsole	 ﾠof	 ﾠconsciousness	 ﾠin	 ﾠcognition.	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠthat	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
“hard,”	 ﾠbut	 ﾠinsoluble.	 ﾠ
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